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Abstract
This paper assesses the efficiency properties of recent corporation tax re-
form proposals of the European Union to introduce international loss consoli-
dation and formula apportionment. We extend the effective tax rate method-
ology of Devereux and Griffith (1999) to allow for a potential loss and use a
large firm level data set to identify the distortions under the current system
and following proposed tax reforms. We assess the efficiency of the overall
tax system using the two concepts of capital export neutrality and market
neutrality. Allowing international loss consolidation in the current system
would signify a movement away from both notions of efficiency. A common
consolidated tax base with formula apportionment system would move the
system towards market neutrality, while improving capital export neutrality
only little.
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1 Introduction
The European Commission’s plans for corporation tax reform in the European
Union are now firmly fixed on the common consolidated tax base. However, the
process has been slow and has faced considerable opposition from various Member
States. So the European Commission adopted a new strategy of stepwise reform
proposals. Along these lines Agu´ndez-Garc´ıa (2006) discusses international loss
consolidation and various forms of formula apportionment. These proposals aim to
reduce compliance costs, mitigate problems with transfer pricing and enhance an
efficient distribution of investment within the European Union. While some empir-
ical research examines the impact of such tax reforms on the Member States tax
revenues, the efficiency aspects have so far received little attention.
This paper tries to fill this gap by analysing the changes in efficiency through
the introduction of international loss consolidation and formula apportionment. For
our purpose we measure efficiency in two dimensions: (i) capital export neutrality
(CEN), which - in this context - holds if capital invested by a company faces the
same tax burden, regardless of where it invested, and (ii) market neutrality (MN),
which holds if no company gains a competitive advantage over another due to dif-
ferences in the taxes that they face. These concepts are introduced and developed
further in Section 2.1
We assess the extent to which the European corporation tax system meets these
criteria by analysing the variation in effective corporate tax rates. We use the
methodology developed by Devereux and Griffith (1999) and extend it to allow for
a potential loss on the hypothetical investment measured. We also extend it to make
use of a large micro-level dataset to identify firm-specific effective tax rates, which
allows us to examine the distribution of the effective tax burden across firms. This
allows us to compare the distortions under the current system with the potential
distortions under the new system with international loss consolidation and formula
apportionment.
The introduction of international loss consolidation would increase the variation
in effective tax burdens, which would represent a move away from both CEN and
MN. However, combining international loss consolidation with a common tax base
and formula apportionment would correct most of these new distortions and sig-
nify a substantial improvement in terms of MN. However, the same move would,
because of differences in statutory corporate tax rates across Member States, fail
to improve significantly in terms of CEN. However, cross border loss consolidation
would open substantial tax saving opportunities, which would only be mitigated
under the formula apportionment system; we do not evaluate the benefit of this
change.
2 Efficiency concepts
The starting point for any analysis of optimal tax systems is the Diamond and
Mirrlees (1971) framework which demonstrated that, within a single country, it
is optimal to preserve production efficiency. This holds when it is not possible
to increase total output by reallocating inputs to different uses, and implies that
the marginal pre-tax rate of return is the same on all investments. However, the
Diamond-Mirrlees theorem relies on two critical assumptions: that there are no
restrictions on the use of tax instruments available to the government, and that
1The concept of capital export neutrality dates back to Musgrave (1959) and Richman (1963).
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economic rent is fully taxed at 100%2 (or there is no economic rent). Keen and
Piekola (1996) analyse optimal tax rates between co-operating countries when eco-
nomic rents exist but cannot be taxed at a rate of 100%. In this case, the optimal
tax system depends on similar factors to those identified by Horst (1980); namely
the elasticity of the supply of savings and the elasticity of the demand for capital
in each jurisdiction. Keen and Piekola also show that the optimal tax structure
depends on the rate at which economic rents are taxed.
A further caveat was introduced in an international context by Keen and Wildasin
(2004). They point out that the Diamond-Mirrlees model does not directly apply
in an international setting, since there is no longer a single government budget con-
straint, but each country has its own budget constraint. They analyse the case in
which lump sum transfers between governments are ruled out, but where transfers
can instead take place via trade taxes and subsidies. Under these circumstances,
it may be the case that the optimal (Pareto-efficient) tax system does not gener-
ate production efficiency. However, as argued by Edwards (2005), if the aim is to
generate a global optimum, it is not clear why governments should co-operate by
adjusting their trade taxes, rather than agreeing to lump-sum transfers. In the
latter case, we are effectively returned to the Diamond-Mirrlees setting of a single
budget constraint.
Although the global optimality of production efficiency is an important issue, we
leave these caveats to one side and instead focus on the implications for the design
of international taxes on profit of a requirement for production efficiency within the
European Union. We consider each member state to be a small open economy, with
access to international portfolio investment. This implies that all companies are
required to earn the same rate of return after source-based taxes on capital income.
Specifically, if corporation tax are source-based, but personal taxes are residence-
based, then the post-corporation tax rate of return is fixed for any company. We
also assume that companies can choose where to locate their investments, and can
also supply third country markets through exporting.
In this setting, Devereux (2008) discusses the properties of international corpo-
ration tax systems that would generate production efficiency. It is clearly the case
that if the post-tax rate of return is fixed and production efficiency requires the
pre-tax rate of return to be the same on all possible investments, then production
efficiency requires the effective tax wedge between pre- and post-tax rates of return
to be the same for all possible investments. This requires the complete harmonisa-
tion of all source-based corporation taxes.
However, in this paper we split this requirement into two elements, which il-
luminate the nature of the proposed tax reforms in Europe. The first element is
capital export neutrality (CEN) (applied to corporation tax):3 that is, any individ-
ual company must face the same effective tax rate on any investment, irrespective
of the location of that investment. In the absence of CEN, taxes may induce a com-
pany to produce in a less efficient location.4 We measure the extent to which the
existing, and proposed, European corporation tax systems meet the requirement of
CEN by considering the company-specific effective average and marginal tax rates
(EATRs and EMTRs) facing any firm when investing either at home or in any of
2See Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971).
3This concept was introduced by Musgrave (1959).
4In a setting without a distinction between portfolio and direct international investment, CEN
can be sufficient to achieve production efficiency. However, with a fixed post-tax rate of return it
is not a sufficient condition.
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the other 26 EU member states. For each measure, we take the standard deviation
of the distribution of effective tax rates for each individual company (separately for
the EATR and EMTR). CEN requires these standard deviations to be zero. We
consider whether potential reforms move the overall system closer towards CEN by
comparing the distribution of these standard deviations across companies under the
existing and hypothetical tax systems.
The second element we consider we refer to as market neutrality (MN).5 This is
related to concepts of Devereux (1990) and, Desai and Hines, (2003). The concept
of MN is that the tax system should not favour one company over another company
with which it competes. If this did not hold, then a less efficient company may have
a competitive advantage over a more efficient company. This of course requires
there to be differences in efficiency between companies, a point emphasised by De-
sai and Hines (2003) in developing their concept of capital ownership neutrality
(CON). Desai and Hines’ concept of CON is that the tax system should not prevent
a more efficient owner acquiring an asset from a less efficient owner. If all assets
were indeed owned by their most efficient owner, then distortion to competition
would be irrelevant. However, this is clearly not the case in practice: companies
with different levels of efficiency do co-exist. If they do co-exist, the production
efficiency requires the broader concept that there is no distortion in the market, so
that the competitive advantage of more efficient companies is not undermined. In
the absence of international trade, the condition for the absence of any distortion in
the market is capital import neutrality (Richman, 1963): that all firms operating in
a given jurisdiction should face the same effective tax rate. But with international
trade, companies producing in different countries may nevertheless compete with
each other in third countries. In that case, production efficiency requires that any
company competing (or potentially competing) with any other in a given market
must face the same effective tax rate; this is market neutrality.
To consider how close existing and hypothetical tax systems are to MN, we iden-
tify a single effective tax rate facing each company as it competes in any potential
market: we measure this by the average or minimum effective tax rate across all
possible investment locations. We also consider separately both the effective aver-
age tax rate (EATR) and the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR). We then consider
the variation in the distribution of these single tax rates across companies. If there
were no variation at all, then the tax system would exhibit market neutrality; the
more variation, the further the tax system is from market neutrality.
As noted above, both CEN and MN are required for production efficiency. By
investigating the proximity of the existing and hypothetical tax systems to each
of these, we believe that it is possible to identify the strengths and weaknesses of
alternative tax systems.
3 Methodology
3.1 The effective tax rate approach
The measures of effective average and marginal tax rates used here build on the
cost of capital approach of Jorgensen (1963) and Hall and Jorgensen (1967), which
was further developed by King and Fullerton (1984) and by Devereux and Griffith
5This concept was called capital ownership neutrality by Devereux (1990); however, we relabel
it here as market neutrality.
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(1999).6 The OECD (1991), Yoo (2003) and the Commission of the European Union
(1992 and 2001) have employed and discussed this methodology in detail; therefore
we only summarize it briefly.
We consider a one-period investment by a firm in the home country through
a subsidiary in a host country. We model this as an increase in investment in
period t of dIt = 1 followed by a reduction of the investment in period t + 1
of dIt+1 = −(1 − δ)(1 + pi) where δ denote the economic depreciation and pi is
the nominal inflation rate.7 The perturbation in the capital stocks generates an
additional nominal output in period t + 1 of (p + δ)(1 + pi) where p represents
the real financial return. In the absence of taxation and assuming that purchasing
power parity holds the net present value of the additional income stream is
R∗ = −1 + 1
1 + ρ
{(1 + pi)(p+ δ) + (1 + pi)(1− δ)} = p− r
1 + r
(1)
where ρ is the shareholder’s discount rate. In general in this paper, we abstract
from personal taxes, so that the discount rate is simply the nominal interest rate,
i = (1 + r)(1 + pi)− 1.8
In the presence of taxation the return is subject to the corporate tax in the host
country τn, which reduces the return in period t + 1 to (p + δ)(1 + pi)(1 − τn).9
Define An as the net present value of tax allowances per unit of investment. If the
investment could be financed through retained earnings the net present value of the
cost of the investment in period t would be (1−An). The reduction in investment
in period t + 1 generates a comparable reduction in allowances. We assume that
the subsidiary repatriates post-tax income to the parent in the form of a dividend.
Define σjn as the tax due on one unit repatriated to the parent. This depends on
the method of double taxation alleviation, as follows:
σjn =

cn exemption
max
{
τj−τn
1−τn , cn
}
credit with limitation
τj(1− cn) + cn deduction
(2)
where cn describes the withholding tax on dividends. Hence the net present
value of the after tax income stream if the investment could be financed by retained
earnings can be written as
RRE = (1− σjn)
[
−(1−An) + 11 + ρ ((1 + pi)(p+ δ)(1− τn)
+ (1 + pi)(1− δ)(1−An))] (3)
Other forms of finance: However, in this paper we consider the case in which
the investment in the subsidiary is financed externally, rather than by retained earn-
ings. We assume that the external finance is provided by the parent, and also take
into account the costs to the parent of raising additional finance. The amount of
finance required is (1 − τnφn), where φn denotes the tax depreciation in the first
6We mainly use the notation of Devereux and Griffith (2003) which is somewhat simplified.
See Devereux and Griffith (1999) for a detailed description of the model.
7For simplicity reasons the inflation rate is assumed to be the same for capital and output.
Further simplifying assumptions are that inflation and economic depreciation are identical across
countries and that purchasing power parity holds, so that the real exchange rate is equal to unity.
We can then drop subscripts for the inflation rate.
8For the calculations we use parameter values of 0.05 for r and 0.025 for pi.
9Note that throughout the paper n denotes the host country while j denotes the parent country.
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period. In the case of new equity finance, and compared to the hypothetical case
of retained earnings, the dividend is not reduced by (1− τnφn) in the first period.
However, the dividend is reduced by (1 − τnφn) in period t + 1 in order to repay
the newly raised equity of (1− τnφn). Abstracting from taxation at the shareholder
level, the net present value of the income stream is unaffected if the new equity is
raised in the parent country, while raising new equity in the host country affects
the timing of the repatriation tax σjn.
In the case of debt financing and again relative to the hypothetical case of
retained earnings, the shareholder receives a (1− τnφn) higher dividend in period t
but in period t+ 1 the debt plus the tax deductible interest needs to be paid back,
which amounts to (1−i(1−τj))(1−τnφn). If the subsidiary borrows from the parent
company the interest payments are deductible, but there is an additional tax burden
because of withholding taxes and the taxation of the receipt of the interest by the
parent. We define ωjn as the total tax on interest payments from the subsidiary to
the parent, which again depends on the method of double taxation alleviation.
ωjn =
 ωn − τn exemptionmax {τj , ωn} − τn credit with limitation
τj(1− ωn) + ωn − τn deduction
(4)
where ωn denotes the withholding tax on interest payments between subsidiaries
and parent companies. Denoting the proportion of the cost of the investment fi-
nanced by new equity in the subsidiary as dNn and the proportion financed by debt
in the subsidiary as dBn and the proportion ultimately financed by debt in the
parent as dBj , the additional costs of financing in the parent or subsidiary are
F =
(1− τnφn)
1 + ρ
[ρ− i(1− τj)] dBj + −ρσjn1 + ρ (1− τnφn)dNn
+
(1− τnφn)
1 + ρ
{σjn [1 + i(1− τn)− (1 + ρ)]− ωjni} dBn (5)
The size of An depends on the type of assets. Machinery is depreciated faster as
buildings and inventories can not be depreciated at all. However, if the inventories
are valuated according to the FIFO method, the increase in value because of inflation
is due to taxation and therefore RRE requires a further adjustment of
RINV = − 1(1 + ρ)
τnpi
(1− τn)(1 + pi) (6)
Setting the NPV of the post-tax income stream,
R = RRE + F +RINV (7)
equal to zero yields the cost of capital
p˜ =
(r + δ)(1−An)
1− τn − δ +
F (1 + r)
(1− σjn)(1− τn) (8)
The EMTR is then defined as
EMTR =
p˜− r
p˜
(9)
The EATR is defined as the difference between the NPV of the income stream in
the absence of taxes and NPV of the income stream in the presence of taxes relative
5
to the NPV of the pre-tax total income stream p/(1 + r). Using the equations (1)
and (7) the EATR is given through
EATR =
R∗ −R
p/(1 + r)
=
p−r
1+r + (1− σjn)
[
1
1+r ((p+ δ)(1− τn)− (1−An)(r + δ))
]
p/(1 + r)
(10)
3.2 Effective tax rates for a new subsidiary with potential
losses
To capture the potential effects of the introduction of loss consolidation and formula
apportionment we need to extend this standard effective tax rate framework. We
depart from the original model insofar as we assume that the subsidiary is new, i.e.
has neither earnings to be retained as a possible form of finance nor there are any
existing profits where any tax depreciation in period t can be claimed. Therefore
they present a taxable loss, that can be carried forward into the next period.
More importantly, however, we also introduce a potential loss to the model to
account for the differences in the outcome under various different systems of group
taxation. With probability q the new investment yields a good outcome of g; with
probability 1 − q it yields a bad outcome b. For the measurement of the EATR,
in order to compare this to the existing framework, we choose values of q, g and b
such that p = qg+(1−q)b.10 We first analyse these two possible outcomes separately.
Good outcome: With a good outcome the subsidiary is profitable, i.e. (g +
δ)(1 +pi) > 1, and is therefore liable to taxation in period t+ 1. The taxable loss in
period t (equal to the depreciation allowance φn) can be offset against the profit in
period 1. The NPV of allowances, An, therefore needs to be adjusted for this delay,
which we denote Aˆn:
Aˆn = An − iφnτn1 + ρ (11)
Apart from this delayed depreciation the good outcome is exactly the same
as described above, therefore the net present value of the investment financed by
retained earnings is similar to equation (3) with replacing p with g and An with
Aˆn:
Rn.c.RE,GOOD = (1− σjn)
[
−(1− Aˆn) + 11 + ρ ((1 + pi)(g + δ)(1− τn)
+ (1 + pi)(1− δ)(1−An))] (12)
The additional term due to the use alternative forms of finance, (5), needs to
be adjusted since the finance which needs to be raised is now 1 instead of (1−τnφn).
10In particular we assume g = 0.3 and b = −0.2 with a probability of the good outcome of
q = 0.8. The latter assumption is in line with the observation of approximately 20 percent of firms
in ORBIS reporting a negative EBIT. Combined this implies a value of 0.2 for p which is in line
with the value used in other studies.
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Fn.c.GOOD =
1
1 + ρ
[ρ− i(1− τj)] dBj + −ρσjn1 + ρ dNn
+
1
1 + ρ
{σjn [1 + i(1− τn)− (1 + ρ)]− ωjni} dBn (13)
Bad outcome: In the case of the bad outcome, the return on investment in
period t + 1 is (b + δ)(1 + pi), where b can be negative implying a real loss. As in
the case of the good outcome, the taxable loss brought forward from period t is
equal to the first year depreciation allowance φn. However, given that the project
yields no taxable profits, these losses can not be used. Further we assume that
after learning about the bad outcome the project is abandoned and the investment
is sold. Therefore the difference between the real value and the tax depreciated
value must be added as a balancing charge of τn [(1 + pi)(1− δ)− (1− φn)]. For
the hypothetical case of investment financed by retained earnings, taxable income
is negative in period t+ 1 if
b < − pi
1 + pi
(14)
We assume that this condition holds (in our central case we assume that b = −0.2
and pi = 0.025). This also implies that the condition holds with other forms of fi-
nance. It also implies that the NPV of the investment is negative and that there is
no dividend tax on the repayment of the equity in period t+ 1.11 Consequently the
NPV of the income stream with the bad outcome simplifies to
Rn.c.RE,BAD = −1 +
(b+ δ)(1 + pi) + (1− δ)(1 + pi)
1 + ρ
=
b− r
1 + r
(15)
The additional costs for the other forms of finance simplify as well, as no dividend
tax is due and only interest payments by the parent are tax deductible.
Fn.c.BAD =
ρ− i(1− τj)
1 + ρ
dBj +
−ωjni
1 + ρ
dBn (16)
Combining outcomes: The overall NPV of the investment project in the
presence of tax combines the NPVs of the good and the bad outcomes, taking into
account the NPV of the retained earnings case, given in equations (12) and (15),
and the terms reflecting other sources of finance, (13) and (16):
Rn.c. = q
(
Rn.c.RE,GOOD + F
n.c.
GOOD
)
+ (1− q) (Rn.c.RE,BAD + Fn.c.BAD) (17)
together with an adjustment for inventory valuation in the case of the good outcome.
The new measure of the EATR is then as set out above:
EATRn.c. =
R∗ −Rn.c.
p/(1 + r)
. (18)
To calculate the cost of capital we follow the same procedure as above, setting
Rn.c. = 0, and in this case solving for g, given assumed values of b and q.12 Using
11The way we model the bad outcome implies that losses after the closing down of a foreign
subsidiary are irrecoverable. This extreme assumption might not hold in reality, but is maintained
to illustrate the underlying mechanisms of loss consolidation.
12Clearly, it would be possible to solve for either q or b instead of g, as long as the other 2 values
were assumed.
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equations (12), (13), (15) and (16) the required real rate of return in the case of the
good outcome without loss consolidation can be written as
g˜n.c. =
(r + δ)(1−An)
1− τn +
iφnτn
(1 + pi)(1− τn) − δ
− 1 + r
(1− σjn)(1− τn)
[
Fn.c.GOOD + (R
n.c.
RE,BAD + F
n.c.
BAD)
1− q
q
]
(19)
Combining with the assumed values of b and q yields the cost of capital
p˜ = qg˜n.c. + (1− q)b (20)
The EMTR is then calculated using the standard equation as defined in (9).
3.3 Effective tax rates with international loss consolidation
We now consider two alternative tax regimes. First, we consider the case in which
international consolidation of losses is permitted, without any other changes in the
tax system. Second, we extend this to consider the case of formula apportionment.
We begin with international loss consolidation. As in the base case, we consider the
good and bad outcomes separately.
Good Outcome: With international loss consolidation, we assume that the
depreciation allowance in the subsidiary in period t represent a taxable loss which
can be transferred to the parent company. Define A∗n as the net present value of the
depreciation allowances in the host country if immediate group relief is claimed:
A∗n = An − φnτn (21)
In addition to this, immediate group relief can be tax deducted by the parent
leading to a tax relief of τjφn.13 (Note that this group relief is not subject to
dividend taxation.) In period t+ 1 the good outcome yields a taxable profit in the
subsidiary, which is taxed in the normal way. The post-tax NPV for an investment
financed by retained earnings is in this case
RcRE,GOOD = τjφn + (1− σjn)
[
−(1−A∗n) +
1
1 + ρ
((1 + pi)(g + δ)(1− τn)
+ (1 + pi)(1− δ)(1−An))] (22)
The additional costs of the other forms of finance are similar to those in the
base case, except that the first year depreciation allowance, φn, is deducted at the
parent country tax rate τj .
F cGOOD =
(1− τjφn)
1 + ρ
[ρ− i(1− τj)] dBj + −ρσjn1 + ρ (1− τjφn)dNn
+
(1− τjφn)
1 + ρ
{σjn [1 + i(1− τn)− (1 + ρ)]− ωjni} dBn (23)
Bad Outcome: If the project is unsuccessful and sold after period t + 1 the
calculation of the NPV with international loss consolidation is more complicated.
It is now possible that the group relief claimed in period t is large enough to imply
13Note that this implicitly assumes that the home country acknowledges the tax base of the host
country. This is not necessarily the case in reality.
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a balancing charge in period t + 1 that can turn the negative taxable income into
a taxable profit. In contrast to condition stated in equation (14) there is no loss
brought forward into period t+1 and therefore the balancing charge does not cancel
out. Hence, assuming that group relief is claimed in period t, the taxable income
in the host country in period t+ 1, excluding financing costs, denoted Tn is
Tn = b+ bpi + pi + φn (24)
which is negative if the following condition holds.
b < −
(
φn + pi
1 + pi
)
(25)
If this condition is met, the investment project is not subject to tax in the host
country. However, the taxable loss can be offset against profit in the parent com-
pany. But if this condition does not hold, the balancing charge is large enough to
create a tax liability in the subsidiary and no taxable loss exists to be offset against
the profits in the parent.
The rest of the NPV of the income stream with the bad outcome is identical to
the case described in equation (15). Hence the post-tax NPV of the income stream
with the bad outcome and international loss consolidation, excluding financing costs,
is
RcRE,BAD =
{
τj
[
φn − Tn1+ρ
]
+ b−r1+r if Tn ≤ 0
τjφn − τnTn1+ρ + b−r1+r if Tn > 0
(26)
These expressions are modified by including external financing costs. In line with
the distinction above, the additional costs of external finance depend on whether
the condition in equation (25) is met. Given that the taxable income in the sub-
sidiary is positive the interest payments for debt raised at the subsidiary can be
deducted at the subsidiary level against τn, up to the point at which taxable in-
come becomes zero. If the taxable income is already negative the deduction of the
interest payments increases the loss that can be offset against profits of the parent.
These effects can be combined to generate an expression for the NPV of external
financing costs in this case:
F cBAD =
(1− τjφn)
1 + ρ
[ρ− i(1− τj)] dBj + (1− τjφn)1 + ρ {−ID − ωjni} dBn (27)
where
ID =
 τji if Tn < 0τnmin [i,(i− TndBn)] if Tn ≥ 0 (28)
denotes the interest deductible in each case.
The expected NPV of the investment is again the probability weighted NPVs of
the good and the bad outcome, Rc = q(RcRE,GOOD +F
c
GOOD) + (1− q)(RcRE,BAD +
F cBAD). The EATR is defined as normal, as
EATRl.c. =
R∗ −Rc
p/(1 + r)
(29)
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Following the same logic as in equation (19) the required rate of return in the
good outcome, g˜l.c. conditional on b and q, with international loss consolidation case
is.
g˜l.c. =
(r + δ)(1−An)
1− τn +
φnτn(1 + r)
(1− τn) − δ
− 1 + r
(1− σjn)(1− τn)
[
F cGOOD + φnτj + (R
c
RE,BAD + F
c
BAD)
1− q
q
]
(30)
Using equation (30) in equations (20) and (9) then yields the EMTR for the
loss consolidation case.
The decision whether to participate: Given that international loss consol-
idation is currently allowed only in a small number of countries, notably in Austria
and Denmark, and that even in these countries it is optional for the company, it
seems reasonable to model participation as voluntary. We therefore assume that
the firm can choose between the immediate group relief against the taxable profits
of the parent company or carry the loss forward to relieve it against the potential
future profits in the subsidiary. However, it is not possible to claim relief for the
same loss at both the parent and the subsidiary level.
Leaving the loss in the subsidiary and carrying it forward allows the firm can
claim relief against the taxable profit in the subsidiary in period t+ 1. The reduced
tax burden in the subsidiary affects the dividend repatriated to the parent, which
in turn is subject to σjn. However, the probability of a good outcome is only q < 1.
Hence with probability (1−q) the firm cannot claim a tax relief in the subsidiary and
can only claim a group relief through consolidation with the parent.14 Therefore
the expected NPV of the initial depreciation allowance tax relief if no group relief
is claimed is:
Eno =
φn
1 + ρ
{q [τn(1− σjn)] + (1− q)τj} (31)
If immediate group relief is claimed the value of the immediate tax relief is cer-
tain and amounts to τjφn. In period t + 1 the additional balancing charge in the
bad outcome can lead to a positive tax in the subsidiary if the condition in equa-
tion (25) does not hold. Therefore the positive taxable income is now subject to
taxation in the host country rather than tax deductible as a loss in the home country.
Econs = τjφn +
1
1 + ρ
{−(1− q)max [Tn, 0] (τn − τj)} (32)
Comparing these two outcomes, the firm will choose to immediately claim group
relief if the expected tax relief in the future is lower than the certain immediate tax
relief, taking into account that the balancing charge might lead to a positive taxable
income in the bad outcome. Define the choice of the firm as η which takes the value
1 if the firm claims immediate group relief and 0 otherwise.
η =
{
1 if Eno < Econs
0 if Eno > Econs
(33)
If the firm chooses to participate the cost of capital and average effective tax
rate are the same as described in equations (29) and (30). The cost of capital and
14We assume that a corporate group can again choose to participate in period t+ 1 if it did not
participate in period t. Therefore it will participate in case of a bad outcome.
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EATR for a non-participating company closely resemble the case of no consolidation
as described in equations (11) to (20). The only difference is, in the bad case the
taxable loss of the subsidiary in period t+1 can be offset against the taxable profits
at the parent level.15 Therefore the EATR and the required return in the good
outcome with voluntary consolidation can be written as
EATRv.c. =
{
EATRl.c. if η = 1
R∗−[Rc−(1−q)(τj b+bpi+pi1+ρ )]
p/(1+r) if η = 0
(34)
g˜v.c. =
{
g˜l.c. if η = 1
g˜n.c. + 1−qq τj
b+bpi+pi
1+ρ if η = 0
(35)
To obtain a measure of the cost of capital and the EMTR equation (35) needs
again be inserted in equation (20) and equation (9).
Consolidation with an already existing subsidiary: In the subsequent
analysis we will use a large firm-level dataset which also allows us to identify whether
a corporate group is already operating a potential host country. For these compa-
nies it is reasonable to assume that they conduct their investment through existing
companies. Assuming that the existing business is profitable enough, the initial de-
preciation and any potential losses are offset against profits in the other subsidiary.
Hence the EATR and the cost of capital can be simplified to the case as described
in equations (8) and (10).16
3.4 Effective tax rates under formula apportionment
The calculation of effective tax rates under a formula apportionment closely resem-
bles the standard base case. This is due to the fact that first year depreciation
allowances are now offset against the consolidated group profit, regardless of the
profit situation of the new subsidiary. The most important difference is the appli-
cable corporate tax rate, which now depends not only on the country where the
investment takes place, but also on the other countries in which the group is lo-
cated. In the extreme case where the investment considered does not affect the
distribution of the factors used to determine the apportionment for the group as a
whole, the applicable tax rate is independent from the tax rate in the host country.
Defining 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 as the share of the new investment in terms of the existing
investment the applicable tax rate can be written as
τFAn = λτn + (1− λ)
l∑
m=1
τmµ
X
m (36)
where m now denotes all the countries the corporate group operates in and µXm
the share of the factor X across existing subsidiaries which is employed in country
m.17
µXm =
Xm∑l
m=1Xm
(37)
In line with Agu´ndez-Garc´ıa (2006) we consider the following apportionment
factors as X: number of employees, cost of employees, turnover, and total assets.
15The underlying assumption is, that if the firm did chose not to participate in period t, it chose
again whether to participate in period t+ 1.
16The exact calculations are available from the authors upon request.
17For simplicity we assume that the new investment is proportional in the apportionment fac-
tor(s). Otherwise the λ becomes location specific and can not be moved in front of the summation.
11
Further we also follow the discussions in the European Commission in assuming
that each member state continues to define its own tax rate. This implies that the
net present value of the tax allowances is now not only host-country specific, as it
is calculated with τFAn . Further, as all the income is consolidated across countries
and then apportioned, there is no longer any dividend tax. Using the applicable
tax rate as defined in (36), the NPV from (3) can be rewritten as
RFARE,GOOD = −(1−AFAn ) +
1
1 + ρ
(
(1 + pi)(g + δ)(1− τFAn )
+ (1 + pi)(1− δ)(1−AFAn )
)
(38)
The tax effects of the other forms of finance are now significantly reduced, as the
lending from the parent to the subsidiary cancels out because of the consolidation.
The only remaining other form of finance that influences the income stream is ex-
ternal debt borrowed by the parent.18 Note that these additional costs are identical
for the good and the bad outcome.
FFA =
(1− τFAn φn)
1 + ρ
[
ρ− i(1− τFAn )
]
dBn (39)
In the bad outcome the first year depreciation allowance φn can be offset against
the consolidated group profit at the applicable tax rate τFAn . However this reduces
the taxable loss (increases the taxable profit) in period t+1 because of the balancing
charge. In contrast to the separate accounting system, the taxable income is now
subject to the factor weighted tax rate τFAn regardless as to whether the income is
positive or negative. Therefore the net present value of the income stream in the
bad outcome can be written as
RFARE,BAD = τ
FA
n φn +R
n.c.
RE,BAD − TnτFAn (40)
Regardless of the outcome, there is now an additional feedback effect of the
investment, as the new investment may alter the applicable tax rate for the existing
operations. Define ∆R as the sum of the changes in the income streams in all
existing locations due to the new investment with a relative size of λ.
∆R =
l∑
m=1
(
Rm(τFA|λ > 0)−Rm(τFA|λ = 0)
)
(41)
This requires an assumption about the income stream of the existing operations.
For the purpose of this paper we take two extreme positions. Firstly we assume
that the existing operations take exactly the same form to the new investment. And
secondly we assume that the new investment can be organized in a form which does
not influence the distribution of the factors used to allocate the profits. Technically
this is achieved through holding λ fixed at zero.
Under the assumption that the existing income stream is proportional to the new
investment it can be shown that the actual size of λ becomes irrelevant. Similar to
the calculation in equation (17), the income stream is given through the probability
weighted average of (38) and (40), RFARE = qR
FA
RE,GOOD + (1 − q)RFARE,BAD plus
the additional feedback term as defined in (41). Rearranging the NPVs of the
income streams to separate the tax effects from the pre tax rate of return and using
equations (36) and (41) the income stream can be written as
18Assuming that interest rates are equal across countries, it is in fact irrelevant where the debt
is raised.
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RFARE = R
∗ +
(
λτn + (1− λ)
l∑
m=1
τmµ
X
m
)
RTAX
+
1− λ
λ
[
RTAX
(
λτn + (1− λ)
l∑
m=1
τmµ
X
m
)
−RTAX
l∑
m=1
τmµ
X
m
]
= R∗ + τnRTAX (42)
where
RTAX = q
[
AFA − 1
1 + ρ
((1 + pi)(g + δ)
+ (1 + pi)(1− δ)AFA) ]+ (1− q)(1 + pi)b (43)
collects all the bits of the income stream subject to taxes.19 In sum, under the
assumption of proportional income streams in the rest of the corporate group, and
in the absence of debt finance, the NPV of the income stream including the feedback
effect simplifies and only depends on the host country tax rate.20
The effective average tax rate under a formula apportionment system is then,
EATRFA =
R∗ − [RFARE + FFA]
p/(1 + r)
. (44)
The necessary return in the good outcome is again obtained in solving the ex-
pected rate of return for g and can be written as
g˜FA =
(r + δ)(1−AFAn )
1− τFAn
− δ
− 1 + r
1− τFAn
[
FFA +
1− q
q
(RFARE,BAD + F
FA) +
1− λ
λq
∆R
]
(45)
The EMTR for formula apportionment is again calculated using (45) in equa-
tions (20) and (9).21
3.5 Firm-specific effective tax rates
Typically, effective tax rates are calculated for countries, or possibly for country
pairs. However, these do not capture all the potential effects of a loss consolida-
tion and a formula apportionment. Therefore we follow the concept of Egger et al.
(2008) and develop firm-specific effective tax rate measures, using information about
each company’s asset, finance and ownership structure from the ORBIS database.
Define Θti, Θ
i
i and Θ
s
i to be the firm specific share of tangible fixed assets TFAi,
intangible fixed assets IFAi and stocks STOi:
19More detailed calculations are available from the authors upon request.
20Note that because of interest deductibility the size of the new investment has some influence
on the results. For our calculations we chose a value of 0.25 for λ.
21This way of calculating the cost of capital additionally requires the fixation of the good outcome
(0.3 in our case) in the existing operations. Alternatively one could solve the cost of capital for the
good outcome of the overall company. These results are available from the authors upon request.
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Θti =
TFAi
IFAi + TFAi + STOi
Θii =
IFAi
IFAi + TFAi + STOi
Θsi =
STOi
IFAi + TFAi + STOi
(46)
In order to exploit more information from the national tax laws we need to
further distinguish between various forms of tangible fixed assets. To do so we use
information about the industry- and size-specific structure of capital assets from a
Canadian study by McKenzie, Mansour and Brule (1998).22 Denoting the industry
as k and size-specific weights as θbk for buildings, θ
m
k for machinery and θ
l
k, the
firm-specific share of tangible fixed assets θti can be decomposed into these three
assets as:
Θbi = Θ
t
iθ
b
k
Θmi = Θ
t
iθ
m
k
Θli = Θ
t
iθ
l
k (47)
Note, that these shares sum to 1: i.e. Θbi + Θ
m
i + Θ
l
i+ Θ
i
i+ Θ
s
i = 1. The weights
can be used to calculate the firm-specific tax depreciation for the first year φi and
the firm specific NPV of the depreciation allowances Ai
φi = φbnΘ
b
i + φ
m
n Θ
m
i + φ
l
nΘ
l
i + φ
i
nΘ
i
i + φ
s
nΘ
s
i (48)
Ai = AbnΘ
b
i +A
m
n Θ
m
i +A
l
nΘ
l
i +A
i
nΘ
i
i +A
s
nΘ
s
i (49)
The parameter for the economic depreciation, δi, is also made firm-specific, us-
ing the same weights.23
To calculate the firm specific finance structure we define the share of debt finance
dBn at the subsidiary level as the sum of current liabilities CLi and non-current
liabilities NLi over total assets TAi
dBn = dBi =
CLi +NLi
TAi
(50)
It is now possible to calculate all the above introduced measures of the cost of
capital and EATRs at the individual firm level by replacing An, φn, δ and dBn
with their firm-specific counterparts Ai, φi, δi and dBi.
4 Data
The firm level data is from largest available set of firm level data Orbis, provided
by the Bureau van Dijk. We start with 930,588 companies which report total assets
higher than 2 million Euros in two consequent years 2001 to 2005.24 As we use
22 See Egger et al. (2008) for the matching of the industry codes and for the used weights.
23In line with the OECD (1991) we use the following assumptions for economic depreciation;
machinery 12.25 percent, industrial buildings 3.61 percent, intangibles 10 percent and no economic
depreciation for inventories.
24The dataset is very similar to the one in Devereux and Loretz (2007), we therefore only present
it very briefly here.
14
information at the firm level only for the weights used in the calculation of effective
tax rates, we average the data over time and use only the cross-sectional variation.
This sample, including non-European companies, is then used to identify the group
structures. A company is treated as part of a group if the database reports a ma-
jority shareholder (more than 50% direct or indirect shareholding) that is within
our sample. Further a company is considered to be part of a group if the database
reports a global owner which itself has a BvD identification number.
We include all 27 EU Member States, which leaves us with a sample of 410,222
companies for which all the necessary data is reported.25 Of these, 114,853 compa-
nies are part of 28,703 corporate groups. We combine these data within the groups
to end up with 323,442 observations. Each of these observations is then attributed
to the country of the headquarter company, unless the corporate owner is outside
Europe. In these cases we treat the national groups within this multinational group
as individual companies. Table 1 summarises the country coverage and the relevant
variables that are used for the weighting of the firm specific EATRs.
This sample includes 4,567 corporate groups that operate in more than one
European country. For these groups we calculate the applicable tax rate under a
formula apportionment system. For this purpose we weight the corporate tax rate
in the countries the group operates with the shares of the apportionment factors
employed there. As in Devereux and Loretz (2008), we use a composite apportion-
ment factor with weights of one third for turnover, one third for total assets, one
sixth for number of employees and one sixth for cost of employees.
The applicable tax rates under the formula apportionment depend on the exist-
ing pattern of investment. Additionally they potentially depend on the location of
the new investment, but only if the new investment alters the overall distribution
for the relevant apportionment factors. For the illustrative purpose in Table 1 we
assume that this is not the case, i.e. we assume that λ is zero. Regardless of the
impact of the new investment on the distribution of the apportionment factors, the
applicable tax rate under a formula apportionment must always be a weighted aver-
age of the statutory corporate tax rates in the individual Member States. Therefore
they are bound with the highest and the lowest rate in the EU, Italy and Cyprus
respectively. Companies located in a high tax country would generally benefit from
a lower tax rate under a formula apportionment system, while the companies lo-
cated in a low tax country would face an increased tax rate.
25In addition to all observations that report missing values for the relevant variables we also
exclude corporate groups that report more than 100% debt or report zero in all three asset variables,
i.e. stocks, tangibles and intangibles.
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5 Results
We are mainly interested in the dispersion of the tax burden under the current
and the proposed tax systems and less so in the bilateral tax burden for a specific
country combination. Therefore we only present very summarised results. The next
section includes some numerical results for the EATRs and a graphical presentation
of the results. The results for the cost of capitals are subsequently presented only in
graphical form.26 Finally we also discuss the importance of the existing investment
under a formula apportionment system, if firms are in a position to organise their
investment such as it does not affect the distribution of apportionment factors.
5.1 Effective Average Tax Rates
To get a first impression of the impact of the different tax systems it is useful to look
at the overall dispersion of the tax burden across all companies. We do so for three
different scenarios: the current system, i.e. without the possibility of international
loss offset; a system of voluntary international loss consolidation without formula
apportionment; and a system with a common consolidated tax base and formula
apportionment.27
Figure 1 shows histograms of the EATRs for these three scenarios. Each his-
togram shows the dispersion of more than 8.7 million tax rates as we calculate the
potential tax burden for 323,442 companies investing in all 27 European countries.
As in all the figures, the graphs are arranged as follows. The upper part of the
figure displays the results for the current system, the middle part for the voluntary
loss offset and the lower part for the formula apportionment system. Moving from
the top downwards two main changes can be observed. First the distribution shifts
to the left, because allowing loss consolidation reduces the effective tax burden.
Further the middle part of Figure 1 show that the introduction of loss consolidation
without formula apportionment would significantly increase the dispersion of the
tax burdens. Note that because of the fact that the loss consolidation would be
voluntary, the distribution only widens at the lower tail. The lower part of the fig-
ure indicates that the overall tax burden under a formula apportionment system is
significantly reduced. However, in contrast to the voluntary consolidation, the lower
tail is less pronounced. This reflects the fact that excessive tax savings because of
loss consolidation is not possible under a formula apportionment system.
26More detailled results are available from the authors on request.
27Specifically we use the following assumptions as discussed by the CCCTB Working Group
(2007): Buildings are depreciated according to a straight line schedule over 40 years, plant and
machinery according to a declining balance scheme at a rate of 20 percent, intangibles are written
down straight line over 15 years and inventories are valuated according to a weighted average.
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18
T
ab
le
2:
S
u
m
m
ar
y
of
R
es
u
lt
s:
D
om
es
ti
c
an
d
B
il
at
er
al
E
A
T
R
s
fo
r
d
om
es
ti
c,
in
b
ou
n
d
an
d
ou
tb
ou
n
d
in
ve
st
m
en
t
d
o
m
e
st
ic
in
v
e
st
m
e
n
t
o
u
tw
a
rd
F
D
I
in
w
a
rd
F
D
I
c
u
rr
e
n
t
fo
rm
u
la
c
u
rr
e
n
t
v
o
lu
n
ta
ry
fo
rm
u
la
c
u
rr
e
n
t
v
o
lu
n
ta
ry
fo
rm
u
la
c
o
u
n
tr
y
sy
st
e
m
a
p
p
o
rt
io
n
m
e
n
t
sy
st
e
m
c
o
n
so
li
d
a
ti
o
n
a
p
p
o
rt
io
n
m
e
n
t
sy
st
e
m
c
o
n
so
li
d
a
ti
o
n
a
p
p
o
rt
io
n
m
e
n
t
A
u
st
ri
a
1
8
.8
%
1
9
.7
%
2
7
.6
%
2
1
.0
%
1
9
.0
%
3
0
.0
%
2
1
.5
%
1
9
.8
%
B
el
g
iu
m
2
4
.2
%
2
6
.8
%
3
0
.2
%
1
9
.1
%
1
8
.6
%
3
8
.0
%
3
0
.0
%
2
7
.2
%
B
u
lg
a
ri
a
1
0
.1
%
8
.0
%
2
7
.0
%
2
5
.0
%
1
9
.9
%
2
2
.2
%
9
.3
%
7
.7
%
C
y
p
ru
s
8
.8
%
8
.9
%
2
8
.0
%
2
6
.2
%
2
2
.1
%
1
7
.7
%
7
.3
%
7
.7
%
C
ze
ch
R
ep
u
b
li
c
2
0
.8
%
2
0
.5
%
3
1
.2
%
2
5
.0
%
2
0
.6
%
2
9
.6
%
2
1
.1
%
1
9
.0
%
G
er
m
a
n
y
2
7
.3
%
2
8
.9
%
3
0
.4
%
1
8
.1
%
1
8
.6
%
4
0
.9
%
3
4
.0
%
2
9
.2
%
D
en
m
a
rk
2
1
.3
%
2
0
.4
%
2
7
.7
%
2
1
.3
%
1
9
.7
%
3
1
.4
%
1
8
.0
%
1
9
.8
%
S
p
a
in
2
7
.3
%
2
7
.1
%
2
8
.4
%
1
8
.1
%
1
9
.4
%
3
8
.1
%
3
0
.6
%
2
6
.2
%
E
st
o
n
ia
2
2
.2
%
1
8
.5
%
2
7
.8
%
2
2
.5
%
2
0
.4
%
3
0
.3
%
2
3
.8
%
1
7
.4
%
F
in
la
n
d
2
1
.9
%
2
2
.0
%
2
7
.8
%
2
1
.0
%
2
0
.4
%
3
2
.2
%
2
2
.6
%
2
0
.6
%
F
ra
n
ce
2
6
.0
%
2
7
.2
%
2
9
.9
%
1
9
.1
%
1
9
.3
%
3
8
.4
%
3
0
.5
%
2
6
.5
%
U
n
it
ed
K
in
g
d
o
m
2
4
.1
%
2
4
.2
%
3
5
.6
%
2
6
.4
%
1
9
.2
%
3
6
.2
%
2
7
.5
%
2
3
.9
%
G
re
ec
e
2
1
.7
%
2
0
.4
%
3
1
.9
%
2
5
.2
%
1
9
.7
%
2
9
.5
%
2
0
.6
%
1
9
.8
%
H
u
n
g
a
ry
1
3
.4
%
1
3
.3
%
2
7
.7
%
2
4
.3
%
2
0
.5
%
2
2
.9
%
1
3
.0
%
1
2
.5
%
Ir
el
a
n
d
1
0
.0
%
1
0
.2
%
2
7
.1
%
2
4
.6
%
2
0
.1
%
1
9
.6
%
9
.1
%
9
.7
%
It
a
ly
2
5
.8
%
2
8
.3
%
3
1
.2
%
1
8
.0
%
1
7
.6
%
4
0
.5
%
3
4
.6
%
3
0
.5
%
L
it
h
u
a
n
ia
1
4
.0
%
1
3
.4
%
2
7
.8
%
2
3
.9
%
2
0
.9
%
2
4
.6
%
3
.8
%
1
2
.3
%
L
u
x
em
b
o
u
rg
2
1
.8
%
2
3
.6
%
2
8
.1
%
1
9
.4
%
1
9
.0
%
3
4
.1
%
2
5
.3
%
2
3
.6
%
L
a
tv
ia
1
1
.6
%
1
2
.3
%
2
7
.6
%
2
4
.5
%
2
0
.2
%
2
1
.7
%
4
.7
%
1
1
.7
%
M
a
lt
a
2
8
.3
%
2
9
.6
%
4
0
.6
%
3
0
.0
%
1
9
.9
%
3
9
.8
%
3
2
.6
%
2
8
.0
%
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s
2
1
.6
%
2
0
.1
%
2
7
.5
%
2
0
.9
%
1
9
.0
%
3
0
.6
%
2
0
.9
%
2
0
.2
%
P
o
la
n
d
1
6
.0
%
1
6
.2
%
2
9
.0
%
2
4
.7
%
2
0
.8
%
2
5
.0
%
1
5
.6
%
1
4
.9
%
P
o
rt
u
g
a
l
1
9
.8
%
2
0
.8
%
2
8
.6
%
2
1
.3
%
1
8
.9
%
3
1
.3
%
2
1
.5
%
2
1
.1
%
R
o
m
a
n
ia
1
2
.5
%
1
2
.9
%
2
7
.8
%
2
4
.4
%
1
9
.8
%
3
0
.3
%
1
0
.2
%
1
2
.5
%
S
lo
va
k
R
ep
u
b
li
c
1
5
.7
%
1
6
.4
%
2
8
.1
%
2
3
.8
%
2
1
.0
%
2
4
.9
%
1
4
.2
%
1
4
.9
%
S
lo
v
en
ia
1
8
.1
%
1
9
.3
%
2
8
.0
%
2
2
.1
%
2
0
.3
%
2
8
.2
%
1
8
.8
%
1
8
.2
%
S
w
ed
en
2
2
.5
%
2
2
.8
%
2
8
.1
%
2
0
.4
%
1
9
.5
%
3
4
.0
%
2
4
.3
%
2
2
.2
%
E
u
ro
p
e
2
4
.6
%
2
5
.6
%
3
0
.2
%
1
9
.9
%
1
8
.9
%
3
0
.2
%
1
9
.9
%
1
8
.9
%
N
o
te
s:
T
h
e
va
lu
e
fo
r
E
u
ro
p
e
re
fe
rs
to
th
e
w
ei
g
h
te
d
av
er
a
g
e
a
n
d
th
er
ef
o
re
is
in
fl
u
en
ce
d
b
y
th
e
co
u
n
tr
y
co
v
er
a
g
e.
19
To assess the impact on the EATRs in the individual Member States Table 2
compares the average tax burdens for a domestic investment, and for inbound and
outbound foreign direct investment. We assume that the domestic investment is
undertaken through the existing profitable parent company, which allows the losses
to be offset. Further we assume that if the parent has an existing subsidiary in
another country, then further investment in that country takes place in the existing
subsidiary and that any losses can be offset there. In contrast if the company has no
existing subsidiaries in the country, we assume that no loss consolidation is possible
under the current system.28 For the domestic investment the current system and
the voluntary consolidation lead to the same outcome as it is possible to consoli-
date domestic losses under the current system. Further, it is always beneficial to
use losses immediately in a domestic subsidiary because the loss carry forward could
only be used against the same tax rate in the future. Even under formula appor-
tionment the tax burden for domestic investment changes little, which is partly due
to the fact the majority of our sample are domestic firms, for which the applicable
tax rate remains unchanged. As a result the differences in the domestic EATR
across countries persist and are only reduced insignificantly.
Comparing the domestic EATR under the current system with that for either
outbound or inbound investment it is evident that the lack of international loss con-
solidation increases the EATR for international investment. This is clearly at odds
with capital export neutrality because domestic investment receives more favourable
tax treatment. While the EATR for domestic investment ranges between 8.8% for
Cyprus and 28.3% in Malta, the country averages of EATRs for outbound invest-
ment range between 27.0% in Bulgaria and 40.6% in Malta. Similarly the country
averages of EATRs for inbound investment vary from 17.7% in Cyprus to 40.9% in
Germany.
Moving to a system of voluntary loss consolidation without formula apportion-
ment would overcorrect the distortion between domestic and foreign investment,
as foreign investment would receive on average a more favourable tax treatment.
Further, the overall reduction in the tax burden of five percentage points relative to
domestic investment is very unevenly distributed. In fact outbound investment from
high tax countries would face a significantly reduced tax burden, while outbound
investment from low tax countries would still face a high tax burden. Overall, the
spread of the average EATR for outbound investment is comparable to the current
system, with values between 18.0% for Italy and 30.0% for Malta. The other side
of this phenomenon is that the attractiveness of low tax countries for inbound in-
vestment is amplified. For countries with a combination of generous depreciation
allowances and low statutory tax rates, for example Lithuania, the average tax bur-
den for inbound investment would be very low. This leads to an extremely large
differential between country averages of EATR for inbound investment, with values
as low as 3.8% for Lithuania on the one hand and tax burdens as high as 34.6% in
Italy.
A switch to a formula apportionment system would almost eliminate the differ-
ences in the EATR between domestic investment and inbound investment. How-
ever, while the tax differential between domestic and inbound investment is reduced,
the EATR still varies significantly across the different member states. Country
averages range from as little as 7.7% for investment into Bulgaria to 30.5% for
investment into Italy. However, for the outbound investment the dispersion is sig-
28For simplicity reasons and to allow a better comparison we also do not allow loss consolidation
in countries like Austria and Denmark, which do allow some form loss consolidation.
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nificantly reduced, with a lowest average EATR of 17.6% in Italy and a highest
average of 22.1% in Cyprus.
Capital export neutrality: It is, however, not possible to evaluate the effi-
ciency only from country averages of EATRs. Instead, we exploit the firm level
information and examine capital export neutrality and market neutrality across in-
dividual companies. From a company perspective capital export neutrality holds if
an investment faces the same tax treatment regardless where it takes place. This
can be measured as the variation between the EATRs a single firm is facing on its
investment across all possible country locations, including its home country. The
lower this variation, the closer the overall tax regime is to exhibiting capital export
neutrality. The first three columns of Table 3 summarise the standard deviation
between the EATRs for each of the 323,442 firms under the three tax systems
considered for each home country. Figure 2 further shows the dispersion of these
standard deviations for all firms.
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Figure 2: Histograms of standard deviation of EATR
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In the top part of Figure 2, showing the distribution of company standard de-
viations under the current system, a rather peculiar distribution can be observed.
In fact, there are three distributions within this histogram. Starting from the left,
the first peak at a standard deviation of around 0.03 there are firms with their
headquarter in countries with a credit system and a relatively high tax rate, like
the United Kingdom, Greece or Malta. The smaller second peak at a standard
deviation of approximately 0.05 represents firms in a country with a credit system
and a moderate tax rate, e.g. the Czech Republic or Poland. The large bulk of
companies is located in either a country with an exemption system, or in a country
with a relatively low corporate tax rate, which effectively exempts foreign income
from home country tax for most outbound investment. These countries have a stan-
dard deviation of their EATRs between 0.06 and 0.1. Therefore, under the current
system, capital export neutrality is to some extent fulfilled for high tax credit coun-
tries, but less so for exemption countries.
The middle part of Figure 2 displays the distribution of standard deviations
under voluntary loss consolidation. Compared to the current system, there is a
widening in the right hand side of the distribution, and an increase in the average
standard deviation. This represents a movement away from capital export neutral-
ity, as the standard deviations are generally higher. There is also an increase in the
spread of tax rates, which stems from the fact that low tax countries will not gain
significantly from loss consolidation, while the high tax countries will benefit most.
Therefore, the firms that face a low domestic tax burden, will face relatively high
tax burdens for outbound investment. At the same time firms with a relatively high
domestic tax burden will have increased low tax opportunities. This results in a
average standard deviation of almost 0.1, with values up to more than 0.2 for some
firms. The three distinct peaks for the different combinations of double taxation
and tax rate combinations are no longer apparent.
The lower part of Figure 2 presents the distribution of standard deviations under
a formula apportionment system. The overall distribution is only slightly further
left than under the current system. However the two smaller peaks of the credit
countries disappear which implies that the overall improvement in terms of capital
export neutrality is only minor. This can also be seen in the third column in Table
3 with a slightly reduced overall standard deviation of 0.065.
Market Neutrality: To assess whether these tax reforms would represent a
movement towards market neutrality we follow two approaches. First we follow a
more conservative approach and stipulate that the requirements for market neutral-
ity are met if all potential competitors face the same tax burden on average. That
is, we suppose that in supplying any given market, a company faces its average
EATR from investing in all 27 locations - the home country and all the other 26
European countries. By comparing the distribution of the average EATR for each
company, we can then observe the extent to which some companies gain a compet-
itive advantage over others. The results of this approach are presented graphically
in the upper row of Figure 3 and on a more detailed basis for each country in the
middle three columns of Table 3.
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Second, we instead assume that each company will invest in that location which
generates its lowest EATR. In this case, market neutrality depends on the distri-
bution of the minimum EATRs across all companies potentially operating in each
market. The results from this second approach are presented graphically in the
lower row of Figure 3 and for each country in the last three columns of Table 3.
The upper left of Figure 3 presents the distribution of the averages of the EATR
in all potential location decisions for each firm under the current system without
loss consolidation. Most of the firms face an average EATR between 25% and 35%
and both the upper and lower tail are relatively short. This implies that the current
system performs reasonably well in terms of MN. The country averages in Table 3
strengthen this impression, as they vary only moderately between 26.3 % in Bul-
garia and 40.1 % in Malta.
In comparison, the lower left part of Figure 3 depicts the distribution of the
minimum EATR for each company under the current system for each firm. Rela-
tive to the average EATR in the upper row the distribution is shifted to the left
and more dispersed. This is also reflected in the country averages in Table 3 where
the differences across countries are now larger than for the averages of the EATR
spreading from 8.8 % in Cyprus to 28.3 % in Malta. Further comparing the min-
imum EATRs with those for domestic investment in Table 2 it can be seen that
the values are identical for all credit countries. This reflects the fact that under
the current system with no consolidation domestic investment is the tax optimal
strategy.
Introducing a voluntary system of loss consolidation would decrease both the
average and minimum EATRs but simultaneously increase their dispersion. From
the upper middle part of Figure 3, it becomes evident that most of the increased
variation in the average EATRs would be in the lower tail. This is due to the
voluntary nature of this tax reform, which implies that firms claim no immediate
group relief if this will increase their effective tax burden. Hence, companies located
in a high tax countries with an exemption system could on average benefit more
from the loss consolidation. The fact that a high home country tax rate implies
bigger tax savings through loss consolidation is also reflected in the country aver-
ages in Table 3. The high tax and exemption countries - Germany, Italy and Spain
- become the home countries with the lowest averages, all below 20 %. At the other
end of the spectrum are the high tax and credit countries like Malta with 29.85 %
or the United Kingdom and Greece. This is due to the fact that credit countries can
only benefit to a limited extent through claiming losses in lower-taxed subsidiaries
against highly taxed home country profits, because the absence of loss carry forward
increases the subsequent tax burden in the subsidiary. And in contrast to the ex-
emption countries these taxable profits are also subject to the higher tax rate of the
home country upon repatriation. Further, low tax countries like Cyprus or Ireland
also cannot benefit from loss consolidation and therefore face relatively large tax
burdens. The increased dispersion of the average EATRs represents a movement
away from market neutrality (using this measure), as the dispersion across firms
rises.
The lower middle part of Figure 3 displays the dispersion of the minimum
EATRs under a voluntary loss consolidation system and even more highlights the
tax planning opportunities available under this system by relocating real invest-
ment. More than half of the firms can direct the investment to a country where it
faces a negative effective tax burden. On the other hand some firms cannot benefit
to that extent from the loss consolidation and face positive (minimum) EATRs of
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more than 30 %. This increased dispersion of the minimum EATRs again repre-
sents a movement away from market neutrality. From the second last column in
Table 3 it can be seen that on average firms have a tax-optimal investment location
with an EATR of 1.2 %. High tax exemption countries like Spain, Italy, Germany
and France gain most, while credit countries, like Malta, United Kingdom, Greece
or the Czech Republic gain less from the new tax incentives and face on average a
higher minimum EATR.
Under the assumption that formula apportionment would be introduced as an
obligatory measure, the distribution of the average EATRs would somewhat widen,
as can be seen in the upper right part of Figure 3. This increased dispersion indi-
cates a small movement away from market neutrality. Comparing the distribution
with the current system shows a significant decrease in the average tax burden.
This is also apparent in Table 3 where the country averages now vary from 18% in
Italy to 21.6 % in Cyprus.
The distribution of the minimum EATRs, depicted in the lower right of Figure
3, is much narrower than for average EATRs. This is due to the fact, that loss
consolidation is now possible and that there are no taxes on repatriation. Further,
in contrast to a system of voluntary loss consolidation system without formula ap-
portionment, no large tax benefits of loss consolidation exist (since it is not possible
to offset a loss in a low tax rate country against a profit in a high tax rate country).
Hence there are no negative minimum EATRs and the distribution in the lower
right part of Figure 3 is substantially less dispersed than for the current system.
This reflects that under a formula apportionment system most companies have sim-
ilar low tax investment opportunities. On this measure then, there is a substantial
improvement towards market neutrality.
Interestingly, the peak of the distribution is also further on the left than under
the current system, implying that firms face on average a substantially lower min-
imum EATR. In the last column in Table 3 it can be observed that the country
averages of the lowest EATR and the averages of EATRs under a formula appor-
tionment system are very similar across countries. This is due to the fact that under
our current assumptions the effective tax burden is determined to a large extent by
the host country tax rate. Consequently the tax burdens vary only little within a
given country, which is in line with the requirement for capital import neutrality.
However, the persisting differences amongst tax rates in the Member States imply
that the effective tax burden are varying substantially across countries. In this sense
it is the same features of the tax system that violate the capital export neutrality
and achieve market neutrality.
5.2 Cost of Capital
The methodology described in section 3 also allows us to calculate the cost of capital
and the EMTR.29 These measures indicate the effect of the tax on the incentive to
undertake an additional marginal investment. We can consider the proximity of the
European tax system to capital export neutrality and market neutrality following
the same approach as for the EATR. Indeed, comparisons based on the cost of
capital are arguably more consistent with optimal tax theory in that the cost of
capital is the relevant measure in the absence of economic rent, and therefore in
29The EMTR as defined in equation (9) becomes meaningless in case of negative cost of capital.
Given that in our voluntary consolidation scenario negative cost of capital are easily possible and
also observed, we only report results for the cost of capital.
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conditions in which production efficiency is held to be optimal. In fact, the com-
parisons based on the cost of capital are similar to those based on the EATR. We
therefore present the results briefly and highlight where additional insight can be
gained.
Capital Export Neutrality: We follow the same approach as for the EATR
logic to measure the extent to which the various tax systems are consistent with
capital export neutrality. That is, we consider the standard deviation for any in-
dividual company over the costs of capital which it would face in each of the 27
possible investment locations: capital export neutrality holds for an individual firm
if the standard deviation is zero. Figure 4 displays the distribution of these stan-
dard deviations for the three scenarios considered in this paper. Comparing the left
hand side part of Figure 4 to the upper part of Figure 2 is can be seen that the
current system appears to match capital export neutrality rather better when the
measure of comparison is the cost of capital, rather than the EATR. This reflects
the fact that the cost of capital depends relatively more on the tax base and less
on the tax rates than the EATR. This narrower distribution reflects the fact that
there is less variation in European tax base definitions than in tax rates.30
Further the three distinct peaks in the distribution for the EATR under the
current system are now longer visible, indicating that the double taxation system
is less important for a marginal investment. Moving right in Figure 4 the same
phenomena as for the EATR can be observed for the cost of capital. Introducing
a voluntary system of loss consolidation without formula apportionment tends to
increase the standard deviation for a large proportion of the sample, and therefore
represents a movement away from capital export neutrality. A formula apportion-
ment system tends to correct some of this newly induced distortions, but still falls
substantially short of achieving capital export neutrality. Despite the fact that the
harmonized tax base is more relevant for the cost of capital, there is more vari-
ation in the standard deviation. This can be traced back two major sources of
variation. First the additional finance cost matter more and secondly the varia-
tion in the asset structure of the companies in combination with the different tax
rates across countries implies a significant move away from capital export neutrality.
Market Neutrality: Here we measure the degree to which market neutrality
is achieved by considering the distribution of the minimum cost of capital facing
each company across its 27 possible investments. The distribution of this minimum
cost of capital is shown in Figure 5, and is again in line with the findings for the
EATR. The increase in the dispersion of tax burdens arising from introduction of
a system with voluntary loss consolidation but no formula apportionment is now
even more pronounced as the minimum cost of capitals in the current system are
relatively concentrated around 0.05. This in itself is remarkably as with our param-
eterisation, i.e. a real interest rate of 5 percent, a cost of capital 0.05 translates into
a EMTR of zero. In the middle part of Figure 5, the distribution is more dispersed
and shifted even further to the left. This highlights that almost all firms have at
least one location where they face a negative EMTR on a marginal investment.
30The one notable exception to this finding is Estonia with its distribution tax and no tax
depreciation.
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In contrast under the formula apportionment system the dispersion of the min-
imum cost of capitals is slightly wider than under the existing system, and the
distribution is located more to the left. The fact that MN is achieved to a lesser
extent that it was with the EATR can be explained through the fact that the ad-
ditional finance cost matters more for the cost of capital calculation. Further the
feedback effect on the applicable tax rate does not completely cancel out for the
way we calculate the cost of capital.31 More generally the reduced cost of capi-
tal in combination with an increased dispersion, illustrate two main aspects of the
introduction of a formula apportionment system. On the one hand MN would be
violated because of the existing differences in tax rates, which would - through the
channel of deducible finance costs and via the feedback effect - create variation in
the potential minimum cost of capital. On the other hand the formula apportion-
ment system implies some tax savings compared to the existing system through
cross-border loss consolidation.
The analysis of the cost of capital highlights the importance of the assumption
about the proportionality of the new investment in both apportionment factors and
profitability. Hence we discuss the importance of the existing operations in the next
subsection.
5.3 The importance of the existing operations
So far we assumed that the investment in the new subsidiary is completely propor-
tional, in both profitability and factors, to the existing operations. This implies
that the relative size of the new investment as measured in λ has only minor impact
on the effective tax burden. However, it seems very likely that the new investment
does not influence the distribution of the apportionment factors at all or is at least
not perfectly in line with the existing company.32 In this subsection we therefore
consider the other extreme case, i.e. the one where the investment does not in-
fluence the distribution of apportionment factors. Technically this is achieved via
holding λ fixed at zero.
Capital Export Neutrality: So far the formula apportionment system showed
only a marginal improvement in terms of capital export neutrality, because of the
persistent variation of the tax rates across countries. If we now consider the case
where the new investment does not influence the apportionment factor, this implies
that the applicable tax rate is the factor weighted tax rate of the countries where
the company is already located. As our sample is dominated by companies, which
are only active in the home country, i.e. are purely domestic, this is most of the
time the parent countries tax rate. In any case the results are determined by the
firm specific tax rates, as given through their distribution of apportionment factors,
and the tax base, which is harmonised across all Member States. Consequently any
given firm faces the same tax rate regardless where it invests. This implies that
CEN is completely achieved.
Market Neutrality: Given the previous result of CEN completely achieved,
the minimum and average tax burden are bound to be identical for each firm.
Hence it is sufficient to analyse one of our two measures of MN. Consequently the
histogram in Figure 6, displaying the minimum EATRs also describes the average
31As mentioned above, we hold the good outcome in the rest of the company fixed at 0.3 while
solving for the necessary good outcome in the new subsidiary.
32In fact it is expected that the investment is strategically adjusted to influence the applicable
tax rate of the overall company. In this paper, however, we do not address these issues, which
should be subject to further research.
30
EATRs. Comparing the distribution in Figure 6 to the two graphs on the right
hand side in Figure 3 two things become evident. First, there is a significant shift
to the right, which is partly due to the geographical breakdown of our sample. The
large number of companies in Italy, France, Spain and Germany translates, under
these assumptions, into a overall higher tax burden. This holds especially true for
the minimum tax rates, as the assumption of λ equal to zero pins down the tax
rates and leave the firm no low tax location choices.
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Figure 6: Minimum and average EATR for the case λ = 0
Secondly the distribution is much more dispersed than in Figure 3, indicating
that a formula apportionment system would under the assumption of an unchanged
distribution of apportionment factors represent a move away from MN. This is more
or less the reversal of the result we found under the assumption of a completely pro-
portional new investment. While the persisting tax rate differentials between the
Member States led to a violation of CEN under the assumption of a proportional
new investment, they now imply a move away from MN under the assumption of
unchanged apportionment factors.
As mentioned above, both assumption of the existing investment are extreme
cases. Abstracting from strategic behaviour of the firm, it still seems realistic that a
cross border investment would imply some change in the distribution of the appor-
tionment factors. Even if the new investment is not completely proportional to the
existing firm, it is therefore important to factor in the feedback effect. Arguably,
the cases of no feedback effect, i.e. λ equal to zero, and the proportional case, where
λ turn out to be of minor relevance, can both be seen as benchmark cases. The
lesson to be learned is that, depending on the size and form of the new investment,
both the location of the existing operations and the location of the new investment
potentially determine the applicable tax rate under formula apportionment. As a
result either CEN or MN are not achieved, because of the existing differences in tax
rates across Member States.
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6 Conclusion
This paper aims to investigate whether international loss consolidation and a for-
mula apportionment would increase the efficiency of the tax system in Europe.
To evaluate the impact of such reforms we first develop the approach of Devereux
and Griffith (1999) in measuring of effective average and marginal tax rates to al-
low for a potential loss in the hypothetical investment considered. We apply this
methodology to cross border investments in Europe. Specifically, we compute the
effective tax rates for a large number of companies in Europe in potential cross-
border investments, using firm-specific data. We compare the existing system to
two comprehensive tax reforms; a voluntary international loss consolidation under
the current system and a obligatory system of international consolidation and for-
mula apportionment. we assess these reforms by reference to how close the overall
system is to two measures of efficiency: capital export neutrality and market neu-
trality.
We show that the current system gives an advantage to domestic investment
because of the lack of international consolidation. As a result, the current system
fulfills the requirements for neither capital export neutrality nor market neutrality.
Changing to a system of voluntary consolidation would partly correct the distortion
between domestic and international investment. However, such a tax reform would
also introduce more distortions, which overall would imply a move away from both
forms of neutrality.
In contrast, the change to a formula apportionment system would have some
desirable efficiency effects. First, the tax differential between domestic and inter-
national investment would be mitigated, and there would be a movement small
improvement towards CEN. For some measures of MN we can show a significant
improvement. However, the results are highly depending on the assumptions of
the existing operations. Assuming that the new investment is proportional to the
existing operations, it is mainly MN which can be achieved. In contrast, under the
assumption that the new investment is not influencing the distribution of the ap-
portionment factors, it is CEN which could be achieved at the cost of a movement
away from MN.
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